Least privilege: review access before someone else does it for you

Permissions pile up on their own: “temporary” grants, role changes that remove nothing and accounts of people who already left. Seven practices to apply least privilege without stopping operations.
Access piles up on its own. Someone joins the service desk and gets administrator rights “while they learn”; they change roles and keep the old permissions; they leave the company and their account stays alive for three months because nobody told IT. None of it shows until a password leaks, and then the possible damage isn’t decided by the attacker: it’s decided by everything that account was allowed to do.
The principle of least privilege is easy to state —every person, service and device gets exactly the permissions its work requires, and nothing more— and hard to sustain over time. Frameworks such as NIST SP 800-53 (control AC-6, Least Privilege) and the CIS Controls (account and access management) treat it as a baseline, not a luxury. These are practices that work in a real IT department without stopping operations.
1. Start with the account inventory, not the policies
You can’t reduce what you haven’t counted. Before writing rules, pull a list of every account: from the directory, from the cloud, from every system with its own users (ERP, firewall, backup console, CRM) and from service accounts. For each one, record the owner, role, last sign-in and access level.
Three surprises almost always turn up: accounts of people who are gone, generic accounts (“reception”, “admin2”) shared by several people, and service accounts with domain administrator rights because “that’s how the install worked”.
2. Separate the everyday account from the admin account
Whoever manages servers shouldn’t read email or browse the web with the same account that holds administrator rights. Give them two: a standard one for daily work and a privileged one used only for administration, ideally from a dedicated device or session.
- The privileged account has no mailbox and no open internet access.
- It requires MFA and, where possible, a hardware key.
- Its name gives it away (for example,
adm-jperez), so every sign-in is easy to review.
3. Grant by role, not person by person
Handing out permissions manually, to each person as they ask, produces over the years a map nobody can audit. Define roles based on real positions (service desk, networking, accounting, management) and assign permissions to the role. Exceptions exist, but they get documented: who asked, why and until when.
A good indicator: if the answer to “what can a level-1 support person do?” doesn’t fit on one page, the roles aren’t defined yet.
4. High privileges, for a limited time
Much of the risk lies in permissions that were needed once and stayed forever. For one-off tasks —a migration, handling an incident, setting up a server— use temporary access: granted with an approval, lasting hours or days, and removed automatically. Many identity and cloud platforms already include it; if yours doesn’t, a task on the IT calendar to remove it beats relying on memory.
5. Joiners, movers and leavers tied to HR
Least privilege breaks down most not at hiring, but when someone changes roles or leaves. Agree with HR on a formal notice in all three cases and a turnaround time:
- Joiner: the account is created with the role for the position, not by copying a coworker’s.
- Mover: the new role is assigned and the previous one is removed.
- Leaver: the account is disabled on the last day, sessions and tokens are revoked, and the equipment is collected.
6. Review access every quarter, with the data owners
IT doesn’t know whether the accountant should still see the payroll folder; her manager does. Periodic reviews work when each department head receives the list of who can access their area and confirms or asks for removal. Privileged access deserves more frequent reviews.
Keep evidence of each review (who reviewed, what was removed and when). Besides serving an audit, it lets you see whether the number of exceptions is going up or down.
7. Don’t forget what isn’t a person
Service accounts, API keys, integration tokens and cloud-connected apps often hold more permissions than any user, and nobody reviews them. Apply the same rules: an identified owner, only the permissions the integration needs, secret rotation, and removal when the system is retired. Also check which third-party apps are authorized over the organization’s email or files.
Where to start this week
- Pull the list of domain and cloud administrators; every name should have a justification.
- Disable accounts with no sign-in in 90 days, after confirming with their department.
- Ask HR for last year’s list of departures and compare it against active accounts.
The goal isn’t to distrust the team, but to make sure that the day a credential leaks, the scope of the problem is small and easy to explain.
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